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DRUG USER FEE REFORM:
THE PROBLEM OF CAPTURE AND A SUNSET,
AND THE RELEVANCE OF PRIORITIES
AND THE DEFICIT
Margaret Gilhooley*
I. INTRODUCTION
On the eve of the presidential election in 2012, drug reform will be
on the legislative agenda because of the need to renew every five years
the authority in the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA, or user fee
law) under which drug companies pay “user fees” when they apply for
approval of a new drug.1 The fees generated from the PDUFA enable the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA, or “the agency”) to hire more
medical reviewers and, thus, to reach a decision more quickly on whether
a drug can be approved.2 The enactment of the program has been de-
scribed as “transformative” in leading to a “change in agency culture”
that recognized performance goals as “a legitimate measure” of the work
of medical reviewers.3 The industry is willing to make these payments in
order to obtain faster FDA action because the patent on the drug is “tick-
ing away” while the FDA reviews the drug.4 The fees have been viewed
* Professor of Law (Retired), Seton Hall Law School. This article benefited
from a summer research grant from Seton Hall Law School. The author worked in the
Office of the Chief Counsel for the Food and Drug Administration from 1975 to 1981.
1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 379g, 379h (2006). Under PDUFA the fees expire on October 1
of the year in which renewal is needed. See Food and Drug Administration Amend-
ments Act of 2007, PUB. L. NO. 110-85, § 106(a), 121 Stat. 842 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 379g, “History” “Sunset date of amendments made by § 106(a) of Act September
27, 2007”). While the program is often referred to as PDUFA, this article refers to it
by the more readily understandable term “user fees.”
2. See James L. Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food
and Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 261, 337 (2005). This student paper won a second prize from the Food
and Drug Law Institute in a writing competition. Id. at 261.
3. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medi-
cal Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1840–42 (1996) (citing remarks of an FDA official).
Richard Merrill is a former Chief Counsel for the FDA. Id. at 1753.
4. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 274. For a review of the history from the industry R
perspective, see Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of Improvements in the FDA’s
New Drug Approval Process: The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, 47 FOOD &
327
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by some as a payment for an increased “service” by the agency.5 These
fees “sunset” every five years.6
PDUFA provides that the agency is to develop goals for the time to
decide whether a new drug application can be approved, and to report to
the relevant congressional committees on its progress in meeting the per-
formance goals.7 By law, before the user fees are renewed, the agency is
to have “negotiations with the regulated industry” about the performance
goals.8 While the meeting is closed, the public has an opportunity to com-
ment on the recommendations made as a result of the negotiations.9 A
congressional renewal of the fees in 2012 is virtually certain since the fees
provide a critical part of the resources for the drug program. A key ques-
tion is whether reforms are needed to address the capture problem and
pressure on the agency created by making a significant part of its funding
dependent upon industry fees that sunset unless legislatively renewed.
Drug user fees were first authorized in 1992 and have been renewed
every five years since then.10 The fees now provide for more than half of
the agency’s budget that is designated toward funding the medical review-
ers who consider applications for new drugs.11 The Institute of Medicine
(IOM) found that “[m]any” on the agency staff and in public advocacy
groups believed that relying so heavily on the drug industry is “inherently
inappropriate to the reputation and functioning” of the drug user fee pro-
DRUG L.J. 483 (1992); Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 96–97 (2004) [hereinafter Kuhlik Intellectual Prop-
erty] (reporting that the effective patent life for drugs is approximately seven years
shorter than other industry averages).
5. See Anna Wilde Mathews, Drug Firms Use Financial Clout to Push Industry
Agenda at FDA, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Financial Clout].
6. Act June 12, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 502, 116 Stat. 687 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 379g, “History” “Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2002;
findings”).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 379h-2 (a)(Supp.2011); see FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS FOR THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT 29–30, 33 (2010) available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/User
FeeReports/PerformanceReports/PDUFA/UCM243358.pdf [hereinafter FY 2010
PDUFA PERFORMANCE REPORT].
8. 21 U.S.C. § 379h-2 (d)(1) and (2) (Supp. 2011).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 379-h-2(d)(4) (Supp. 2011). For concerns about the negotiations,
see Financial Clout, supra note 5; and Zelenay, supra note 2, at 310–11. R
10. See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN,
FOOD AND DRUG LAW 679 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter HUTT ET AL.]; Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, PUB. L. NO. 110-85, § 103, 121 Stat. 826–32
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379g) (authorizing PDUFA for another five
years).
11. HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 680. R
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gram.12 The extent of the funding, as well as the closed-door negotiations
between the industry and the agency, can give rise to an appearance of
the classic problem of “capture” of an agency by those regulated by it.13
At this point, some believe it is “unclear” whether faster reviews are bet-
ter for the public health because with a faster review the drug may have
risks that would have been revealed by a more thorough review.14 A re-
cent article in a medical journal criticized the negotiations over perform-
ance goals between the agency and the industry as an “implicit[ ] and
inappropriate political bargain.”15 According to the author, the fact that
the agency will commit to try to meet the performance goals in exchange
for the industry’s support of the fees is problematic.16 Instead the author
recommended that the performance goals be eliminated entirely or that
Congress establish them.17 Conversely, another recent article noted that
the faster drug reviews made possible by the drug user fee program have
alleviated drug lag and increased the likelihood that drug companies will
seek approval for a drug in the United States rather than overseas.18 User
fees are available for other government programs, but this article focuses
on the special issues created by a drug user fee for a health-based pro-
gram that faces a sunset.19
This article maintains that reforms are needed in the framework for
drug user fees and that caution is needed when creating a permanent
12. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE FUTURE OF
DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 195
(2007) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
13. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3,
3–4 (1971) (maintaining that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit”); Financial Clout, supra note 5 R
(describing how the pharmaceutical industry bargained with the FDA over an in-
crease in fees, “giving the industry a greater role in shaping the priorities of its
regulator”).
14. Zelenay, supra note 2, at 328. R
15. James Dabney Miller, FDA Performance Goals for Approving Drugs and Bio-
logics, 302 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N 189, 189–90 (2009).
16. Id. at 189.
17. Id. at 190.
18. Mary K. Olson, PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 393, 394–95 (2009). The availability of consumer advertis-
ing in this country may also influence pharmaceutical companies’ choice to seek ap-
proval in the United States. See NOAH LARS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY 370 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the European Union prohibits consumer
advertisements and that New Zealand is the only other country that allows it).
19. See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 852 (1987) [hereinafter Federal User Fees]
(recognizing that drug regulation to promote public safety can enhance consumer
confidence in a way that supports some level of fees).
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funding commitment under a set formula at a time of growing budget
shortfalls. The article recommends that drug user fees be based on a
health review rationale, rather than a fee-for-service rationale. To provide
perspective on the health impact, a study is needed on the extent to which
public health has improved because of the faster approval of drugs made
possible by the drug user fee program. The study should also seek to de-
velop better priority rankings than the simple one that underlies the pre-
sent negotiated performance goals. For example, the priorities could be
based on whether a drug offers a major health benefit compared to ex-
isting drugs or has only a modest, limited or standard advantage. The
priorities and study could also provide guidance to Congress on the allo-
cation of funding among government programs when budget cutbacks
may lead to reduced support. The public interest at stake is better re-
flected by designating the payments, not as a “user fee,” but as a “health
review fee.”
This article also addresses the two major issues that have arisen with
respect to the drug user fee program. First, it will address the possible
responses to the concern that the extent of industry funding creates a risk
of “capture” of the agency. The IOM reported that an industry official
was concerned that as user fees approached half of the budget, there
could be a “perception that this is an industry-driven program.”20 The
IOM favored full funding of new drug safety responsibilities from govern-
ment appropriations, but that level of support seems unlikely given the
concerns about the deficit.21 This article supports, at a minimum, limiting
user fee support to half of the cost of the drug approval program, with the
rest coming from government appropriations.
Second, this article will examine the proposal that the drug user fee
program be made permanent, so as to end the closed-door negotiations
with the drug industry that occur when the fees are up for renewal, and
the pressure this can create. The agency’s need for a renewal of the fees
creates an opportunity for the industry and agency to link the passage of
the bill to certain statutory changes, which can create the appearance that
the agency has been held “hostage.”22 The agency’s need for renewal can
also result in the adoption of provisions that might otherwise have not
20. See IOM REPORT, supra note 12, at 196. R
21. Id. at 197–98.
22. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 294 (stating that in the 1997 reauthorization of R
PDUFA “the pharmaceutical industry and Congress decided to use the re-authoriza-
tion . . . as a vehicle for broader reforms,” however, there were concerns that such
renewals could hold the agency “hostage” to industry’s demands). The absence of a
specific legislative proposal for permanent funding complicates analysis, but it is im-
portant to consider the potential implications of the underlying concept.
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been adopted but for the renewal requirement.23 In addition, making the
program permanent seems particularly appropriate in the wake of Citi-
zens United v. Federal Communication Commission (Citizens United), as
it may permit the expansion of corporate financing for independent polit-
ical statements about a candidate that are not coordinated with the
campaign.24
While making the fees permanent has advantages, a major drawback
is that it could create another “uncontrollable” item in the budget at a
time when the deficit is a controversial emerging issue. The 2010 report of
the President’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Re-
form (Fiscal Commission)25 drew attention to the importance and diffi-
culty of the budget issues.26 In 2011, after a heated battle over raising the
federal debt ceiling, Congress established a bipartisan legislative commit-
tee to recommend spending cuts and revenue measures to reduce the def-
icit by $1.5 trillion over ten years, to be approved by Congress with an up-
or-down vote on November 23, 2011.27 Nevertheless, Standard & Poor’s
23. Id. (illustrating, as an example, that in the 1997 reauthorization of PDUFA the
“FDA would have preferred a ‘clean bill’ . . . without any sweeping reforms, [but] it
was forced to accept Congress’ and industry’s desires for broader changes for fear
that, unless it did so, PDUFA would not be re-authorized and FDA would be forced
to fire most of its review staff”).
24. See 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
25. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND REFORM: THE MOMENT OF TRUTH (Dec. 2010). available at http://www.fiscal
commission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_
2010.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL COMM’N REPORT]. The report was expected to be ap-
proved by a majority of the members and to be influential in congressional decision-
making, although it did not receive enough votes for immediate congressional consid-
eration. See Jackie Calmes, Fiscal Plan Is Expected to Fall Short of Votes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2010, at A22.
26. For example, some economists were concerned about making spending cut-
backs while the recession continues. See, e.g., Christina D. Romer, Now Isn’t the Time
to Cut the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at BU5. Another criticized the Fiscal
Commission for recommending tax cuts that benefit the wealthy, but tax increases
that hurt the middle class, such as a proposed elimination of the deductibility of mort-
gage interest. See Paul Krugman, The Hijacked Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2010, at A31. For an exercise in the challenges in cutting the deficit, and the readers’
views, see David Leonhardt, O.K., You Fix The Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/weekinreview/14leonhardt.html, and David Leon-
hardt, 7,000 Ways to Fix the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/weekinreview/20101121-deficit-graphic.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
27. See Jennifer Steinhaur & Robert Pear, Debt Bill Signed, Ending Crisis and
Fractious Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011, at A1. This paper was completed and for-
warded for publication before the report of the congressional deficit committee be-
came available.
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still reduced the credit rating for U.S. bonds from AAA to AA+ because
the “gulf between the political parties” had reduced its confidence in the
“effectiveness” of American political institutions.28
The general significance of the deficit and what should be done is
not the concern of this article. The focus here is on a more limited equity
and policy question. Specifically, if deficit concerns lead to general cuts in
federal spending, should a program partially funded by user fees be con-
sidered nondiscretionary and not subject to the cuts? The Fiscal Commis-
sion recommended a cap on discretionary federal spending and a return
to funding at pre-recession levels.29 In his 2011 State of the Union mes-
sage, President Obama supported a “five-year partial freeze” on non-se-
curity domestic spending.30 As a result, the criteria for the categorization
of a program as discretionary will become critical to whether the program
receives funding. If the drug user fee program is not subject to reductions
because it is “nondiscretionary” or “permanent,” additional questions
arise about the impact of cutbacks in related agency programs such as
drug enforcement.
This article suggests that any across the board freeze or cut should
apply to the user fee-supported drug program, unless Congress and the
President make a specific exemption and identify the reason for doing so.
That approach would ensure that our elected officials are responsible for
decisions on the equity of the allocation of the burden of funding cut-
backs. Moreover, the resources to ensure compliance with the drug laws
should not be cut back when the number of new drugs approved contin-
ues to grow, supported in part by user fees.
The current drug user fee program needs to be renewed by October
2012, which sets the timeframe for addressing the issues raised here.31
This article aims to identify the key issues with respect to the structure of
the present program, and provide a perspective on alternatives. What
constitutes adequate reform is an important question that warrants more
attention by legal academics, the medical community, and the public.
28. Binyamin Appelbaum & Eris Dash, S.&P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S.
for the First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at A1.
29. FISCAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 25, at 20, Recommendation 1.1; see also R
Damian Paletta, Key Tax Breaks at Risk as Panel Looks at Cuts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25,
2010, at A1 (reporting that the Commission was looking at freezing domestic discre-
tionary funding).
30. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Proposing Bipartisan Effort to Win the Future,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1. President Obama also supported $78 billion in cuts
to the Pentagon’s budget over five years. Id.
31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. R
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In exploring the reforms needed, Part II provides an overview of the
drug approval requirements and the history of the drug user fee program.
The discussion surveys the present basis for determining user fee funding,
the accomplishments of the program, and the responses that have already
been made to the criticisms of the program.
Part III examines reforms needed in the drug user fee program that
relate to its overall aims and justifications. The discussion criticizes the
“service” rationale for user fees and identifies an alternative health ratio-
nale based on drug risks and health priorities. This Part also urges a study
to establish priorities for drugs that reflect these health factors. If user
fees are limited in the future because of budget deficits or to avoid the
risk of capture, there may be a delay in meeting review goals. The priori-
ties for review will become more important in a time of constricted fund-
ing. Additionally, manufacturers may be concerned about the impact of
delay on the remaining patent life of a drug, an issue also noted in this
Part.
Part IV examines measures to deal with the capture problem associ-
ated with relying on industry fees to support a major part of the costs of
the drug review. The discussion covers why, at a minimum, the fees
should not exceed the amount appropriated from government funds.
Part V considers whether the drug user fee program should be made
permanent as a way to deal with the linkage problem and the concerns
about industry influence that result from the periodic sunset of the drug
user fee program. One argument against this type of change is that it
could lessen Congress’s role in allocating scarce funds if concerns about
the deficit lead to general cutbacks in government programs. The adop-
tion of a permanent program, therefore, should provide that the drug fees
are subject to general cuts in funding, absent a specific exemption. This
will reinforce Congress’s responsibility to make the difficult decisions on
funding priorities in the face of cutbacks.
Part VI concludes the article by emphasizing the need for user fee
reform to deal with the risk of capture and the leverage that the current
sunset provision provides the drug industry. Solving these problems by
providing for a formula to govern the level of support for the drug user
fee program is questionable given the cutbacks that other programs may
face because of the deficit. Congress needs to retain responsibility for
determining the level of support for the drug user fee program in rela-
tionship to similar public programs when there is not enough to meet all
of the needs.
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II. FRAMEWORK FOR DRUG USER FEE PROGRAM
AND HISTORY
This Part will provide an overview of the FDA’s statutory authority
for approval of drugs, and the drug user fee program. Additionally, the
discussion will survey positive accomplishments, criticisms, and the re-
sponses to concerns that have arisen. The Parts following will explore fur-
ther reform approaches to deal with the concerns about capture and the
sunset of the fees.
A. Drug Approval Requirements
Before a new drug can be sold in the United States, the FDA must
find that the drug is “safe and effective” for its use based on “adequate
and well-controlled studies” submitted to the agency in a new drug appli-
cation (NDA).32 Drugs can contain powerful chemicals that may pose se-
rious or life-threatening side effects.33 Their safety has to be determined
on a risk-benefit basis.34 In evaluating the risks and benefits of a potential
drug, and to guard against the placebo effect, the agency conducts con-
trolled tests before determining that the drug is safe and effective for
use.35
B. Framework of the Drug User Fee Program
This subsection will provide an overview of the need for additional
funding for the FDA, the fee levels, and the agency’s goals on timeliness.
1. Origins and Concern with Drug Lag
David Kessler, who was the FDA commissioner when user fees were
approved in 1992, saw the program as a way to respond to the criticisms
that new drug therapies were approved faster in Europe than in the
32. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (d)–(e) (Supp. 2011). For an overview of the law see Mer-
rill, supra note 3, at 1764–69. R
33. See Zelaney, supra note 2, at 264–65 (describing the Elixir Sulfanilamide Trag- R
edy of 1937 where “over 100 people, many of whom were children, died after in-
gesting S.E. Massengill’s new antibiotic product” and Congress reacted by passing the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938); Merrill, supra note 3, at 1764 R
(“Drugs [are], after all, biologically active agents and thus inherently posed some
risk.”).
34. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 694–96 (quoting the testimony of FDA R
Commissioner George Larrick from a 1964 House hearing where he stated “[t]he
decision to approve a drug for marketing, or to withdraw an earlier approval requires
a weighing of the benefit to expected from use . . . against the risk inherent in its
use”).
35. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1771. R
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United States, thus creating a “drug lag” in the U.S. approval process.36
At that point, the time between the testing and obtaining approval of an
NDA had reached a remarkable thirteen years.37 The drug user fee pro-
gram was intended to decrease the amount of time that passed between
when a drug company submitted an NDA and the time at which the
agency determined whether the NDA would be approved.38 The AIDS
crisis provided a dramatic illustration of the health drawbacks of delay in
approving therapies to treat life-threatening conditions, which, because of
the AIDS crisis, led the agency to develop measures to expedite approval
of promising drugs even before full testing was completed.39 The drug
industry was also willing to support the user fees because the lag time
between submission of the NDA and the drug’s approval dramatically cut
into the remaining patent life of the drug, thereby reducing one’s reve-
nue.40 Furthermore, the growth in the federal deficit may have provided
additional support for obtaining funding from fees rather than general
government appropriations.41
2. Fee Determinations and Impact on Industry
The law provides that each drug manufacturer who seeks approval
for an NDA has to pay a fee,42 which originally was $100,000 but rose to
$896,200 in 2007.43 The amount for applications involving clinical data for
36. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 271–72, 275–78 (describing the genesis and con- R
sequences of the drug lag and outlining a history of the events and consensus leading
up to the creation of PDUFA in 1992).
37. See id. at 272.
38. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. R
39. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 648–50. R
40. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 278 (during negotiations with the FDA over the R
approval of PDUFA, the pharmaceutical companies’ lobbying group “asserted it
would support user fee legislation only if FDA agreed to certain requirements,” in-
cluding that fees were “wed to a long-term commitment by FDA to reduce drug ap-
proval times,” which the FDA agreed to); id. at 272 (noting that the drug lag
“obviously translated into greater research and development (R&D) costs for the
pharmaceutical industry”); see also infra note 116 and accompanying text (describing R
how the time lag for drug approval decreases the number of years the drug is on the
market with patent protection).
41. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 276 n.138. For a history of the FDA’s reluctance R
to impose user fees and its later acceptance, see Federal User Fees, supra note 19, at R
851–52.
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h(a).
43. WHITE PAPER, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT (PDUFA): ADDING RE-
SOURCES AND IMPROVING PERFORMANCE IN FDA REVIEW OF NEW DRUG APPLICA-
TIONS 14–16 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/
PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM149130.pdf [hereinafter FDA WHITE PAPER 2005].
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fiscal year 2012 is $1,841,500.44 In fiscal year 2012, companies must also
pay an establishment fee of $520,100 and a product fee of $98,970.45 The
basis for the fees is set by a formula that builds on the 1992 levels, and
takes both inflation and workload adjustments into account.46
The constantly escalating fees have led to criticism (and greater
scrutiny).47 Industry participants have questioned whether the FDA needs
to have ten or twenty staff people attend a meeting with a drug company
when only two or three participate in the discussion.48 The agency has
recently completed a new building complex in White Oak, Maryland, and
it is possible that some of the increase in fees may be attributable to the
drug user fee program’s share of the construction costs. A full exploration
of the reasons for the growth are beyond the scope of this article, and
would need a separate study.
Another concern, from the drug industry’s perspective, is that the
easy ways to speed up the review process have already been made, and
there would be “diminishing returns” for the industry in simply ex-
panding the scale of funding.49 One author suggests that to “get more
drugs approved faster,” there is a need to focus on the entire process,
including requirements for pre-clinical studies.50 Given this view of the
program’s aim, the next reauthorization process may seek to have
changes in the pre-clinical stage as well.
3. Commitments on Performance Goals for Priority and Standard
Drugs
The FDA’s “performance goals” for reviewing an application for ap-
proval distinguish between two categories, that of priority drugs and that
44. Notice: Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2012, 76 Fed. Reg.
45831 (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter FY 2012 PDUFA User Fee Rates].
45.  Id.
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h(c)(1), (c)(2) (2006).
47. See, e.g., Henry I. Miller, The FDA’s Imprudent Caution, POL’Y REV.,
June–July 2010, at 73, 78–79, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-
review/article/5325 (criticizing the “constantly escalating” user fees as a discrimina-
tory tax on the drug sector and one that small companies can “ill-afford”).
48. See HUTT ET. AL, supra note 10, at 684. R
49. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 682–83 (citing Steve Urslin, Diminishing R
Returns, BIOCENTURY, Feb. 13, 2006 at A1) (describing how each year drug user fees
account for more of the costs paid for reviewing applications but “most of the pro-
gress in reducing review and approval times was made in the first two years—between
1993 and 1995”).
50. Id. at 683.
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of standard drugs.51 The current goal for priority drugs is for the FDA to
complete ninety percent of the reviews in six months, while the goal for
standard drugs is to complete 90 percent in ten months.52 The agency
commitments are not part of the law but are stated in letters to the con-
gressional committees as goals the agency will seek to observe.53
C. Positive Accomplishments
This subsection notes the improvements in the timing of reviews
made possible by the fees and the added authority the agency has re-
ceived as part of the user fee renewal process.
The drug user fee program has largely alleviated the drug lag be-
tween drugs approved in this country as compared to Europe, increased
the likelihood that drugs will be sold here first,54 and changed the
agency’s culture.55 By fiscal year 2010, the agency anticipated it would
meet almost all of the performance goals, helped by the decline in the
number of filings for original NDAs.56
The drug user fee program was originally aimed at providing fund-
ing and performance goals to permit faster agency action on the applica-
tions for new drugs.57 As discussed below, some believe that the need to
renew the fees can hold the agency hostage to accepting debatable mea-
sures.58 The need to renew fees can also lead to changes that strengthen
the agency’s authority. A notable example occurred when cardiovascular
risks were found in the widely used arthritis drug Vioxx after it was on
the market.59 The public’s concerns led Congress to require a better sys-
51. See FY 2010 PDUFA PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 7, at Executive R
Summary (unnumbered page) (noting the different performance goals for standard
and priority drugs).
52. Id. at 16.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 379 h-2 (a) (Supp. 2011). See FY 2010 PUDFA PERFORMANCE
REPORT, supra note 7; HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 679; Miller, supra note 15, at R
189–90.
54. See Olson, supra note 18, at 394–95. R
55. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1842. R
56. See FY 2010 PDUFA PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 7, at Commis- R
sioner’s Report (unnumbered page). In fiscal year (FY) 2008 and 2009, the agency
met only one-third or one-half of the performance goals because of the added work-
load created by statutory amendments. See id.
57. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 278–79; supra Part II.B.1. R
58. See infra Part V.A.
59. See Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures
and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 950–53, 957–58 (2007) (describing
the FDA’s immediate reactions after the discovery of Vioxx’s high cardiovascular
risks and the agency’s now existing authority to withdraw drugs from the market); id.
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tem for detecting post-approval risks and to strengthen the agency’s au-
thority to take action with respect to the risks.60
D. Responses to Criticisms of the Renewal Negotiation and
Inflation Adjustments
The drug user fee program has received its share of criticism involv-
ing capture and linkage, which will be discussed in Parts V and VI. This
section notes the responses to the criticisms of renewal negotiations and
inflation adjustment calculations.
1. Closed-Door Negotiations on Renewal and Minutes
User fees expire every five years, leading the industry and the
agency to negotiate behind closed-doors for months about renewal.61
These negotiations include the performance goals and commitments that
the agency will seek to follow in reviewing applications.62 In 2006, Com-
missioner Kessler stated that the negotiations raise “troubling questions”
since the industry gains “leverage on setting the agency’s priorities” and
especially so when “a growing percentage” of the budget comes from the
fees.63 Nonetheless, he did not think the FDA had been compromised so
far.64
To deal with this problem of leverage and the risk of extraneous
arguments that might be made in private negotiations, the law now pro-
vides that the minutes of the meetings between the industry and the
agency are to be publicly available and are to summarize any “substantive
at 960-61 (providing an overview of legislative changes that provide post-approval
testing and warnings that strengthen the FDA’s enforcement powers).
60. See IOM REPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5, 11 (recommendations 5.1 and 5.2 ask R
that Congress ensure that the FDA has the ability to make post-marketing risk assess-
ment and risk management programs to monitor and ensure safe use of drug products
and to provide the FDA the authorized authority to carryout its drug safety responsi-
bilities); Gilhooley, supra note 59, at 960–61 (describing a law that authorizes the R
FDA “to require a drug sponsor to conduct post-approval studies or clinical studies
for a drug” and “strengthen[s] the [FDA’s] enforcement powers by giving . . . the au-
thority to impose fines or civil money penalties”). At one point, the FDA’s removal of
seven drugs from the market was seen by some as an indication that drugs were being
approved too fast because of the user fee program. Zelenay, supra note 2, at 308–309, R
308 n.410 (listing the seven drugs withdrawn from the market).
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 379 h-2(d)(1)(F) (2006) (permitting the FDA to have negotia-
tions with the regulated industry over reauthorization); supra Part IV.A (describing
the risk of undue influence of the pharmaceutical industry over the FDA because of
the user fees the industry pays).
62. See 21 U.S.C. § 379 h-2(d) (2006).
63. Financial Clout, supra note 5. R
64. Id.
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proposals” made and any significant controversies.65 The law also requires
the agency to consult with experts, health care professionals, and repre-
sentatives of “consumer advocacy groups” in developing recommenda-
tions, as well as two congressional committees.66 Although the minutes
can help provide some safeguard against inappropriate trade-offs, ques-
tions remain about the impact of the closed negotiations with the drug
industry. Making the fees permanent would alleviate this downside of the
present approach.
2. Complications in Making Inflation Adjustments
In the early years of the drug user fee program, user fees were avail-
able only if the appropriations for the drug user fee program were main-
tained at the 1992 level adjusted for inflation.67 The formula, as it
operated, meant that the agency had to shift appropriated funds to the
drug review approval account from other programs in order to obtain
user fees.68 These shifts came at a cost of cutting back the support for
funding of post-approval monitoring and even the food safety program.69
Congress alleviated the problem of having an exact match between
appropriations and fees by authorizing a 3 percent flexibility range or
cushion for determining compliance with the formula.70 The lesson here
might be that if Congress makes the drug user fee program permanent,
and requires that it not exceed appropriated funds, there could be com-
plications in working out the level of funds available, and a cushion may
well be needed. The formula is important, but its working is beyond the
scope of the present endeavor.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 379h-2(d)(6)(B).
66. Id. § 379h-2(d)(1)(A)–(E). The agency is to seek public input and hold public
meetings “prior to beginning negotiations with the regulated industry on the
reauthorization.” Id. § 379h-2(d)(2).
67. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 277, 283–84. R
68. Id. at 293. In 1997, the FDA was reported to have begged Congress to proceed
quickly on user fee renewal because “it needed user fee reauthorization by June to
maintain its programs and to avoid layoffs.” Id. at 294 n.302 (citing Jill Wechsler,
Congress Debates FDA Fees and Funding; Determination of Its Budget for Fiscal Year
1998 Will Be More Complex Than Usual, BIOPHARM, Apr. 1997, at 12).
69. See id. at 293, 312 (indicating that shifting of funds may have come from food
safety monitoring and post-market surveillance activities).
70. See id. at 318 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 379h(g)(2)(B)).
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III. RATIONALE FOR USER FEES: SERVICE OR HEALTH
REVIEW AND PRIORITIES
Before turning to the issues about capture and the need for a per-
manent program, this Part examines the need to move away from the fee-
for-service rationale for user fees to one based on the need for a health
risk-benefit review (Health Review). The Health Review rationale can
provide better guidance to the agency and Congress on the priorities for
the program that may become more significant in case of funding
shortfalls.
A. User Fees, Service Rationale, and Delegation Cases
The imposition of user fees for government programs has been
viewed as one that enables the agency to provide the “service” of making
possible faster reviews in exchange for the fees paid by the industry under
the law.71 This characterization of the drug user fee program reflects the
Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable Television Ass’n v. United
States, which avoided issues about Congress’s constitutional ability to
delegate authority to an agency to impose a tax by reading the statute as
authorizing fees based on the value given to the recipient, rather than the
public interest.72 The standards used by the Court in reaching this deci-
sion have been described as failing to provide “a model of clarity.”73
Later, in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.,74 a case involving
pipeline safety, the Court found that the validity of a delegation does not
depend on whether it is made under the taxing power or some other
71. See Financial Clout, supra note 5 (stating that in the “early 1990s, companies R
unhappy with the pace of drug approvals agreed to pay the FDA millions of dollars in
annual fees to help speed its performance”); Andrew C. von Eisenbach, State of the
FDA, 62 FOOD DRUG L.J. 423, 425 (2007) (quoting a speech by the FDA Commis-
sioner that his view on those “who question the current reliance on user fees, I would
say only that user fees are simply that: a fee for a service”); see also Miller, supra note
15, at 190 (criticizing the linkage between the fees and performance measures as un- R
necessary and “appear[ing] to have a deleterious effect on public health”).
72. 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974) (“A ‘fee’ connotes a ‘benefit’ and the Act by its use
of the standard ‘value to the recipient’ carries that connotation. The addition of ‘pub-
lic policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts,’ if read literally, carries an
agency far from its customary orbit . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., Federal User Fees, supra note 19, at 822–24 (suggesting the difficul- R
ties created by National Cable Television in distinguishing between taxes and fees and
noting the Court’s concern for “constitutional constraints on the ability of Congress to
delegate taxing power to agencies”).
74. 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989).
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power, but on whether the law provides adequate standards.75 The Court
found the standards to be adequate because the fees could only be spent
for the pipeline safety program, and were set generically on the basis of
miles or revenue.76 Another important limit was that the agency could not
expand its budget because the fees could not exceed 105 percent of the
congressional appropriation in that year.77 In effect, the agency was
obliged to “set a fee that corresponds to some conception of what is
‘fair,’” rather than merely have the goal of making the agency self-
sustaining.78
The drug user fee program meets this standard for delegation. The
fees are authorized specifically for the drug user fee program and in-
creases are largely driven by a formula that builds on a benchmark of
spending in 1992.79 The formula is, if anything, too automatic and has led
to increases that cover over half of the cost of the drug approval pro-
gram.80 Being able to fairly impose fees requires consideration of the pub-
lic interest as well as the industry’s concerns. As discussed next, a health
review rationale serves that interest.
B. Health Risk-Benefit Review Rationale for Drug Fees
The characterization, terminology, and rationale behind drug user
fees are important issues, especially in light of competing demands on
government funds. Thus, it is appropriate to consider alternatives to the
“service” rationale for the drug user fee program and the adequacy of the
standards.
75. Id. at 218 (“[S]o long as Congress provides an administrative agency with stan-
dards guiding its actions such that a court could ‘ascertain whether the will of Con-
gress has been obeyed,’ no delegation of legislative authority trenching on the
principle of separation of powers has occurred.”) (quoting Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989)); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Reconsidering the Nondele-
gation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80
IND. L.J. 239, 317–18 (2005) (suggesting difficulties for courts to analyze and react to
statutes that fail to provide any limits on the amount of the tax or the ability of the
agency to spend monies raised).
76. Skinner, 490 U.S. at 219–20.
77. Id. at 220; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 74, at 275 (noting that the Court R
limited the use of funds “only for purposes of administering the Pipeline Safety Acts,
and that the fees had to be set generically”).
78. See Federal User Fees, supra note 19 at 827 (citation omitted). R
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. R
80. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 681–82 (as of 2005 user fees paid for over R
50 percent of costs).
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Under PDUFA, the fee is called a “user fee,”81 but that term makes
sense only for those who receive a special benefit from using government
facilities, such as a visitor to a national park, or a driver on a highway who
has to pay a toll. A drug company, however, is not like a visitor to a
national park, as the drug company must obtain FDA approval before
selling a new drug to the public.82 The user fee, therefore, is a means of
assisting the government in protecting the public from potential hazards.83
The approval requirement was not intended as a benefit or service to the
company, although, in practice, it may actually operate as one, since a
lack of approval may serve as a barrier to entry and competition.84 The
fee may also increase “public confidence” in drug products.85 While drug
companies pay fees that allow the FDA to hire more reviewers, the ulti-
mate aim of the agency review, and the fees, should be recognized as a
means of protecting the public health.
Instead of a service rationale for fees, the drug user fee program and
its fees should be guided by the need for a Health Review. New drugs
contain powerful chemicals that can cause harm to users. Like other risky
activities, such as pipeline safety, the government should be able to
charge user fees that permit the agency to determine the risks. An anal-
ogy exists with respect to the government’s requirements for automobile
emission testing and the imposition of fees by the state or a private com-
pany that does the emissions testing.86 These fees are not to aid the indi-
81. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, PUB. L. NO. 102-571, § 101, 106
Stat. 4491 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379g (2006)).
82. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355d–355e (2006); supra Part II.A.
83. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, PUB. L. NO.102-571, § 102, 106
Stat. 4498 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379g (2006)) (“[T]he public health will
be served by making additional funds available for the purpose of augmenting the
resources of the Food and Drug Administration that are devoted to the process for
review of human drug applications.”).
84. See Joseph Jadlow, Competition and “Quality” in the Drug Industry: The 1962
Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments as Barriers to Entry, ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV., Winter 1971–72, at 103, 103.
85. See Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. & Budget for Heads of Exec.
Dep’ts & Establishments, Transmittal Memorandum No. 1 (July 7, 1993), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a025/ (finding that a “special benefit” can
accrue when a federal activity “contributes to public confidence in the business activ-
ity of the beneficiary,” such as “insuring deposits in commercial banks”); Federal User
Fees, supra note 19, at 874 (arguing that a user fee should not be less than the agency’s R
full costs where the governmental service “lessens the risk or burden that a commer-
cial activity imposes on third parties,” such as safety inspections).
86. For example, in the past, state employees in New Jersey did the emissions
inspections and charged a fee. See N.J. ends auto inspections, limits emissions testing,
ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 2, 2010, available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/08/
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vidual motorist, but to guard against the car being a source of air
pollution that can harm the breathing public.87 Likewise, the fee paid by
the drug industry should not be seen as primarily benefiting the drug
company that is paying the fee, but instead should be seen as protecting
and benefiting the public at large who may consume the drug. FDA regu-
lation increases public safety and consumer confidence in the drug, which
“redounds to the benefit” of the company.88
Drugs can be considered safe only if their proven benefits outweigh
the risk.89 Drugs that do so are beneficial to the public, and an unneces-
sary delay in their approval can be a detriment to public health. Thus, a
fee program to permit timely reviews of the safety and effectiveness of
new products is a benefit to the public, and not solely to the company.
The rationale for the drug user fee program should be focused on the
health interest of the public, and should not be viewed as a tax or as a
service that the agency owes to the company, as if the company were a
funder or customer. Recognizing health as the rationale for the fees also
directs more attention to the extent to which the program and the priori-
ties for review serve the public’s health interest.
C. Better Identification of Drug Priorities
This subsection discusses the generality of the agency’s existing cri-
teria, and suggests the need for a study based on health factors that would
provide better guidance.
1. Existing Criteria
The amount of user fees for the drug user fee program is largely set
by a formula.90 The agency’s role is shaped by the performance goals that
nj_ends_auto_inspections_limit.html. Now, however, the state requires private inspec-
tions at service stations that charge set fees. Id. The Clean Air Act calls for emission
testing as a way to reduce air pollution. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
MILESTONES IN AUTO EMISSIONS CONTROL, http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/airpage
.nsf/283d45bd5bb068e68825650f0064cdc2/b62803941b6599e088256c080074b33f!Open
Document (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) [hereinafter MILESTONES IN AUTO EMISSIONS
CONTROL].
87. MILESTONES IN AUTO EMISSIONS CONTROL, supra note 86. R
88. See Federal User Fees, supra note 19, at 852 (summarizing the FDA rationale R
for user fees at the time the agency sought congressional authorization for the user fee
program).
89. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 685–86 (citing Drug Safety, Hearing R
Before H. Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964) (“We require[ ]
information about effectiveness for . . . drugs in order to reach a decision about
safety.”) (quoting testimony of FDA Comm’r George Larrick)).
90. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. R
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are set for the reviews of priority drugs and standard drugs.91 The basis
for determining priority drugs is a key determination that requires further
explanation.
The agency’s performance goals already recognize that priority
drugs are reviewed faster than standard drugs.92 Currently, the criteria
used in determining whether a drug is a priority drug is solely based on
whether a drug will serve an “unmet need” or has a “significant improve-
ment over current treatment.”93 A standard drug is one that does not
meet the criteria for being a priority drug.94 The overall performance goal
is to complete 90 percent of the reviews for priority drugs within six
months, and the goal for standard drugs is to complete 90 percent of the
reviews within ten months.95 All the priority drugs, though, are lumped
together into one category.96 The law provides for “fast track” expedited
agency review of drugs to treat serious or life-threatening conditions such
as AIDS or cancer.97 Nonetheless, drugs for expedited review do not even
receive separate recognition as a top priority in meeting performance
goals, although these drugs likely receive that ranking in practice. The
FDA has also established performance goals for procedural and process-
ing goals with respect to matters such as responding to meeting requests
and dispute resolution matters.98 Recently, the agency met the 90 percent
performance goal for reviews of standard drugs but failed to meet the
performance goal for priority drugs, completing only 80 percent of the
reviews in the required timeframe.99 The increased workload due to im-
plementing statutory changes lowered performance.100
91. See supra Part II.B.3.
92. See supra Part II.B.3.
93. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT III—INITIA-
TIVES & EVALUATIONS, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF FDA’S FIRST CYCLE REVIEW
PERFORMANCE–FINAL REPORT 15–16 (exhibit 10) (2008), available at http://www
.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm127982.pdf
[hereinafter INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF FDA’S FIRST CYCLE].
94. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 709 (citing CDER MANUAL OF POLICIES R
AND PROCEDURES 6020.3, PRIORITY REVIEW POLICY, Apr. 22, 1996) (defining all
known non-priority drug applicants as standard review applicants).
95. See supra Part II.B.3.
96. See FDA WHITE PAPER 2005, supra note 43, at 14–16. R
97. See 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2006); Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologi-
cal Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threaten-
ing and Severely Debilitating Diseases, 53 Fed. Reg. 41516 (Oct. 21, 1988) (codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 312 and 314).
98. See FY 2010 PDUFA PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 29–40. R
99. Id. at Executive Summary (unnumbered page).
100. Id. at Commissioner’s Report (unnumbered page).
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As Commissioner Kessler has observed, the negotiation process
gives the industry leverage over the agency’s ability to set priorities.101
Better identification of the criteria for priority drugs is a means to em-
phasize the health-based concerns that underlie the public interest. The
criteria may need to be taken into account in assessing the procedural
goals for different types of drugs.
2. Need for Health-Based Priority Criteria
A study to develop better criteria for priority rankings is needed. If
there is a funding gap for reviews, priority determinations will assume
greater importance. Moreover, the health-based priority criteria can help
guide the timing and process for drug reviews instead of the closed-door
negotiations between the industry and the agency that now occurs.102 The
determination of priority criteria raises issues that need to be assessed by
experts in medical research and drug policy and a study is needed to de-
velop better rankings. One approach would be to have categories that
designate a drug as representing a major advance, a moderate advance, a
limited benefit, a dosage convenience, or some other factor.
If it is determined that more priority grades would be useful and this
change is adopted, it should not mean that drugs in lower grades are re-
viewed only after the reviews are completed on the higher priority drugs.
There should still be goals for each priority category, although they may
differ by category, as they do now between priority and standard drugs.
Lower priority drugs still have a health or user benefit that needs to be
respected. A novel lifesaving drug might take a considerable amount of
review time, and a lower priority drug might be reviewed in a much
shorter time. Thus there are likely to be difficult judgment decisions in
allocating resources among the priority drugs.
The drug’s priority may be initially determined by the claim for the
drug and its initial showing of support. The full testing for the drug,
though, may increase or weaken the basis for that priority ranking. While
the determinations may be difficult, the overall priorities are important to
the public, doctors, and the industry, and more should be done to make
the criteria open to public assessment.
3. Priority Rankings for Function Claims
A product can be a drug even if it does not provide a medical bene-
fit in preventing or treating disease, since the definition of a drug also
101. See Financial Clout, supra note 5; see also supra notes 63–64 and accompany- R
ing text.
102. See Financial Clout, supra note 5; supra Part II.D.1. R
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includes products that “affect the structure or any function of the
body.”103 This category covers products that claim to have physiological
effects, especially when the use has a safety impact.104 Drugs can provide
improvements in the functioning of the body, such as a helping with hair
growth, restless leg syndrome, erectile dysfunction, or contraception. If
funds are limited, another issue may be the extent to which there should
be a higher priority for new applications for drugs for disease treatment,
rather than for improved function. A study on drug priority criteria
should consider whether the function category should be a separate cate-
gory all together. Alternatively, instead of creating a separate category
for drugs that provide function improvement, the study should also con-
sider: (1) grouping these drugs with the priority drugs that are fashioned
for disease treatment, and (2) basing priority on case-specific factors,
such as the drug’s potential benefit for an important function versus the
existing treatments that are available for improving that function.
4. The Debatable Relevance of Cost in Priority Rankings
A study on priority drug criteria should address whether cost factors
should have any role with respect to the rankings. The enactment of
health care reform has increased concern with health care costs, an issue
in which the FDA plays a limited role.
The FDA reviews the safety and efficacy of claims made for a drug,
and does not consider cost factors. Cost considerations are generally left
to health insurers, government payers, and individual patients, and some
health insurers are now experimenting with ways to control costs, such as
for the use of expensive drug combinations for cancer treatment.105 Any
103. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006). The drug definition also includes products
intended to prevent or treat disease. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B).
104. See United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799
(1969) (classifying an antibiotic test laboratory aid to be a drug rather than a device
based on the statutory purpose in protecting the public health); United States v. An
Article . . . Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d. Cir. 1969) (classifying as a drug a
face cream that claimed to provide “a face lift without surgery” because it constituted
a representation that “affect[ed] the structure of the body in some medical—or drug-
type fashion”); William Vodra et al., Drug: General Requirements, in DAVID ADAMS
ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 287 (2008) (finding that perhaps
“the most difficult delineation of drug status” involves differentiating products that
affect structure and function in a way covered by the drug definition from other FDA-
regulated products).
105. See Reed Abelson, Insurers Test New Cancer Pay System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 2010, at B1. Some former Medicare officials have also proposed that Medicare
should pay for expensive treatments for three years but then cut the reimbursement
rate to that of cheaper treatments if experience does not show that they work better.
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study of the priority criteria to be used during the review process should
consider whether cost factors should have any special relevance in the
agency’s determination of the timing of reviews. For example, if a drug
manufacturer has expressly shown its drug to be cost effective, perhaps a
higher priority ranking may be warranted.
D. Study on Health Impact
A study should also be conducted on the types of drugs approved
since user fees started and on any differences before and after the pro-
gram started with respect to the health status of the public. Such a study
could help in developing priority criteria for the order in which drugs will
be reviewed. Moreover, because the growing federal deficit seems likely
to lead to cutbacks in many government programs, information about
health impact can provide an important benchmark for determining an
acceptable allocation of resources among programs when there is not
enough to go around.
IV. REFORM DIRECTIONS ON CAPTURE PROBLEM: FULL
OR MATCHING GOVERNMENT FUNDING
This Part examines reforms to address the potential for agency cap-
ture when the fees paid by the industry cover a substantial amount of the
costs for the drug approval program. The next Part focuses on the appro-
priateness of making the drug user fee program permanent to address the
related concern about linkage when the fees have to be renewed.
A. Capture Risks for Drug User Fees
The risk of “capture” of an agency by the regulated industry is a
problem that extends beyond the drug field. A leading article maintained
that industries regulated or affected by government programs have a nat-
ural interest in influencing the program and seeking to shape its policies
to serve the industry’s interest, a problem referred to as the capture of an
agency.106 The ways in which capture can occur and the response needed
is shaped by the nature and structure of the specific program.107
See David Leonhardt, Proving Innovation in Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at
B1 (summarizing an article in Health Affairs in which this proposal is discussed).
106. See generally Stigler, supra note 13. R
107. See Federal User Fees, supra note 19, at 873 (proposing an auction system as a R
response when “exclusive use or access to scarce resources” is at stake). For a reflec-
tion of the intensity of the debate about the grazing permits, see Robert H. Nelson,
Government as Theater: Toward a New Paradigm for the Public Lands, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 335, 337 (1994).
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The user fees for drug reviews present a special risk of capture be-
cause the industry funding supports the salaries of the very individuals
who review drugs for approval. Moreover, by 2005, user fees provided 56
percent of the funding for the drug user fee program.108 The IOM re-
ported that the industry itself was concerned with the perception that the
“industry is paying for the review process.”109 As noted above, in 2006
Commissioner Kessler stated that the negotiations over renewal of the
fees raises troubling questions when “a growing percentage” of the
budget comes from the fees, but he did not believe that the agency had
been compromised so far.110
B. Reform Direction: Full Funding or a Match
The options to alleviate the capture risks from industry funding, as
discussed below, are to have no industry funding or to limit its extent.
1. Full Government Funding and Added Revenue Sources
Eliminating user fees to support the agency’s drug user fee program
would directly address the heightened concern about capture. Indeed, the
IOM urged Congress to increase the resources provided to the FDA and
favored having all of the funding for the drug user fee program come
from general appropriations rather than user fees.111 The IOM suggested
studying additional revenue sources that could be used to support appro-
priations, including a tax on the revenues from prescription drugs that are
directly advertised to consumers, commonly referred to as Direct-to-Con-
sumer (DTC) advertisements.112 Since newly approved drugs are often
advertised on television to consumers, the tax might garner substantial
revenues. On the other hand, the agency has to expend resources to re-
view the advertisements with respect to any potential for deception or to
address any new safety risks found in use,113 which gives the linkage some
basis, although an indirect one. The manner of calculating the tax is not
108. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10 at 681–82 (citing Steve Urslin, Cinderella’s R
Glass Slipper, BIOCENTURY, Sept. 18, 2006, at A1).
109. IOM REPORT, supra note 12, at 196 (quoting a Pharmaceutical Research and R
Manufacturers of American (PhRMA) executive).
110. Financial Clout, supra note 5. R
111. IOM REPORT, supra note 12, at 13, 197–98. R
112. Id. at 198–99. The IOM also suggested a tax on drug sales but recognized the
difficulties involved. Id. at 198. Fraud and abuse settlements in drug cases might ar-
guably be another source, but these revenues may be viewed as a source of support
health care.
113. See infra Part V.B.3 (relating FDA guidance principles and review of DTC
ads); supra Part II.C.2 (discussing potential for post-approval risks that may create a
need for an agency response).
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clear though. In the end, a congressional enactment seems doubtful given
the current political controversy about imposing new taxes.114
2. Capping User Fees and Its Impact
Another alternative is to ensure that the predominant part of the
funding for the drug user fee program comes from government appropri-
ations. Having the drug user fee program funded half by user fees and
half by government appropriations is a reasonable alternative that pro-
vides added resources for the agency program while alleviating the cap-
ture problem.115
If Congress appropriates only a limited amount because of the in-
creasing budget deficit, the agency may not be able to complete reviews
within the performance time goals the industry or the agency would like.
The agency should act as expeditiously as possible within the appropria-
tions provided by Congress and do so first for priority drugs. The non-
priority standard drugs will lag behind for approval if funds are short.
That, however, does not mean that user fees should be allowed to exceed
half of the amount appropriated. Instead, more attention needs to be
given to the priority criteria that the agency should use if Congress does
not find the means to provide additional funding. These priority criteria
should be health-based, as discussed earlier, in Part III.
C. Manufacturer Patent Protections and Low Priority “Me-Too” Drugs
If there is a limit on the funding for drug reviews because of budget
deficit factors, the agency’s timeliness in making reviews is likely to be
affected and especially so for the low-ranking priority drugs. The manu-
facturers of these drugs may be concerned with the impact that a longer
time for agency review will have on the ticking patent clock.116 Congress
has already provided a patent extension of up to five years to reflect the
114. See Carol E. Lee & Damian Paletta, Obama Stokes Deficit Fight—President
Rips GOP Fiscal Plan, Says Mix of Taxes, Cuts Needed; Foes Dismayed, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 14, 2011 at A1 (stating that “Republicans reaffirmed their opposition to tax in-
creases”); Jackie Calmes & Carl Hulse, Part of the Budget Fight: Picking a Bad Guy,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A24 (noting that even “Democratic leaders have not
pressed for raising taxes”).
115. A matching government appropriation can also provide added support for the
delegation permitted under Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218
(1989). See also Krotoszynski, supra note 75, at 241 (identifying the special concern R
about delegations of the taxing authority as related to ensuring that Congress takes
“political responsibility for finding the means of paying for” a program it establishes).
116. See Kuhlik Intellectual Property, supra note 4, at 96–97 (noting that R
“[a]lthough the term of a patent is twenty years from filing, the effective patent life
for pharmaceuticals—the time remaining following FDA approval—is approximately
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time for FDA review and clinical trials, but if the time for review in-
creases significantly, more relief may be sought.117
If additional patent protections are sought because of the “delay” in
approval, ironically, the new protections may have the most benefit for
drugs with the lowest priority ranking. The lowest priority is for a stan-
dard drug, which is a drug that does not provide a “significant improve-
ment compared to marketed products.”118 The FDA is likely to act slower
on the least inventive drugs, resulting in more of their patent life expiring.
Legislation providing for an extended patent life may benefit standard
drugs that largely duplicate existing drugs and ones that have gone ge-
neric.119 If additional patent protection is provided, consideration should
be given to the need to have labeling and consumer advertising for a stan-
dard drug that adequately reflects the basis for the FDA’s non-priority
ranking. The advertising, for example, might state that the drug is “an-
other painkiller” or another drug for allergy relief or another therapeutic
use for the drug. Consumers are unlikely to realize that drugs are not
tested to show that they are an improvement over existing drugs when
they do not claim to have a comparative advantage.120 A disclosure like
this, that the drug is an additional remedy to others in the class, can aid a
doctor in advising a patient on the decision of which drug to choose. Try-
ing to address the impact of delay in drug approvals for similar drugs
raises difficult issues. This discussion aims to identify the issues at stake,
and a possible way to address them.
eleven to twelve years in practice . . . [while] [e]ffective patent life for other industries
averages approximately 18.5 years.”).
117. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5)(E)(g)(6)(A)–(B) (2006). See generally Suzan
Kucukarslan & Jacqueline Cole, Patent Extension Under the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511 (1994) (discuss-
ing the policy goals of the Patent Term Restoration Act and assessing the impact of
the law on patent restoration).
118. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 709 (quoting CDER MANUAL OF POLICIES R
AND PROCEDURES 6020.3, PRIORITY REVIEW POLICY, Apr. 22, 1996).
119. See Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, How Many “Me-Too” Drugs Is
Too Many?, 305 J. AMER. MEDICAL ASS’N 711, 711 (Feb. 16, 2011) (maintaining that
newly approved me-too drugs are likely to be much more heavily marketed and pre-
scribed than generic drugs even in the absence of data to show that there are differ-
ences in clinical outcomes that warrant the higher price).
120. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 691 (“A history 1962 Amendments reveals R
a Congressional decision that the FDA not refuse to approve a drug on the ground of
‘relative efficacy,’ i.e., that a more effective drug is available.”); Gagne & Choudhry,
supra note 119, at 711 (describing the untoward effects of “me-too” drugs, which are R
drugs that achieve the same outcomes as drugs already on the market).
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V. “PRESSURE” AND LINKAGE: REFORM BY MAKING
FEES PERMANENT?
This Part considers the periodic sunset of user fees, and the debate
about whether the Obama administration might be “pressured” to accept
questionable changes in order to avoid having to layoff needed medical
reviewers. The 2012 round for renewing PDUFA should consider making
the drug user fee program permanent as a way to address this concern.
Before the program is made permanent, it is important, of course, to be
sure that the substantive provisions are adequate. This Part surveys the
reasons for having a permanent program and the drawback of having an
automatic commitment of government funding to match the fees on a
continuing basis. This article suggests that if fees are made permanent,
the law should ensure that Congress makes the important decisions on
how to allocate funds among competing needs at a time when concerns
about the federal deficit may lead to significant cutbacks.
A. Funding Sunset: Potential for Pressure and Linkage
The discussion here will survey the reports that the sunset has af-
fected reviewers, creates pressure to accept questionable changes and
gives the drug law a more tentative aspect.
1. Pressure on Reviewers?
The existing authority for levying user fees is for a limited five-year
period, and the industry’s support is important if Congress is to renew the
fees.121 The agency faces, in effect, a funding sunset for a critical program
every five years, and the prospect of having to let go of half of its drug
review staff.122 Some report that the dependence on industry funding cre-
ated an implied pressure to approve drugs and an agency culture that
leaned towards approvals.123 How much this perception persists might re-
121. See supra text accompanying note 1; Zelenay, supra note 2, at 294 (stating that R
in the 1997 reauthorization of PDUFA the “FDA would have preferred a ‘clean
bill’ . . . [but] it was forced to accept Congress’ and industry’s desires for broader
changes for fear that, unless it did so, PDUFA would not be re-authorized and FDA
would be forced to fire most of its review staff”).
122. Zelenay, supra note 2, at 288. This problem was exacerbated before Congress R
adopted a cushion in determining the match between user fees and earlier appropria-
tion levels. See supra text accompanying note 70. R
123. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 309 n.415 (quoting several FDA officials, includ- R
ing Dr. Solomon Sobol, a former director of the FDA, who stated that the “basic
message [under PDUAFA] is to approve,” and a former FDA Deputy Commissioner,
who stated that “there are some who argue that what Congress really wanted was not
just decisions, but approvals,” and also citing a “1998 survey of 53 FDA reviewers, of
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quire an anonymous survey of the reviewers. The temporary funding for
the drug user fee program has the potential to create anxiety for review-
ers, which by itself is a factor that weighs in favor of a permanent pro-
gram.124 Congress may have reauthorized user fees in bills without
substantive changes out of a concern that experienced drug reviewers
would leave the agency because the time required for negotiations could
lead to a gap in funding.125
2. Linkage and the 1997 Experience
The 1997 renewal is also notable because of the number of substan-
tive changes made in the legislation that accompanied the renewal of
PDUFA.126 These included authorizing the FDA to approve “fast-track
drugs” that had the potential to treat a serious or life-threatening condi-
tion based on “surrogate indicators,” with the sponsor to do further test-
ing after the drug was on the market.127 The law also allowed accredited
third parties to make recommendations about the classification and re-
view needed for medical devices.128 Congress did not provide that the
third-party reviews would have presumptive weight with respect to the
approval of the drug, a change that could have fundamentally altered the
agency’s role.129
The 1997 renewal also made changes that set the stage for two im-
portant constitutional challenges. First, a limit on advertising about phar-
macy compounding of drugs led to a major Supreme Court decision that
found the restriction to be in conflict with the protections for commercial
speech.130 Pharmacy compounding originally was a means for making mi-
nor variations of a drug to meet individual needs, based on a prescription,
whom ‘19 identified a total of 27 drugs that they reviewed that they believed should
not have been approved but were approved’”) (citations omitted).
124. See supra text accompanying note 64 (noting former Commissioner Kessler’s R
view that the agency had thus far not been compromised by the leverage involved in
PDUFA negotiations); Financial Clout, supra note 5 (noting that the FDA stated “it R
needs more money for its drug-review process, to meet growing costs and to fund
services sought by companies”).
125. See Zelenay, supra note 2, at 315–16 n.456 (suggesting that in 2002 Congress R
reauthorized user fees without substantive changes in order to avert layoffs at the
FDA and loss of talented employees if the law had been delayed by further
negotiations).
126. Id. at 295–300 (identifying key differences in 1997 PDUFA from the 1992
PDUFA).
127. See 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2006); Zelenay, supra note 2, at 293–94, 294 n.300. R
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 360m (2006).
129. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1857–63. R
130. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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such as making a better-tasting form of an unpleasant medication that a
child might refuse to take.131 The Court’s decision permitted advertising
of compounds (to encourage a wider market), so long as there is a disclo-
sure about the lack of FDA approval.132 Another provision in the renewal
law limited the distribution of reprints of medical articles about off-label
uses; this led to a district court finding that the limit was inconsistent with
commercial speech rights.133 This district court decision remains influen-
tial even though it was vacated on appeal on the grounds that the provi-
sion was a non-binding safe-harbor.134 Thus the PDUFA renewals can set
the stage for litigation on constitutional issues that might not otherwise
have arisen.
3. Policy Drawbacks of Linkage of Funding to Reauthorization of a
Substantive Law
The desirability of legislative changes is a matter of judgment, and
there can be different views on the merits of these reforms among legisla-
tors and the administration, as well as between FDA officials and staff
members. Still, it seems like poor public policy to make a major source of
the agency’s funding contingent upon congressional renewal of the user
fees in bills that can include permanent substantive changes.
Typically, agencies have to obtain appropriations from Congress,
and they may not get all the funding they want.135 Appropriation bills,
though, are presumed not to make substantive changes in the law, and
their effect is for a limited time, unless Congress clearly indicates other-
wise.136 The drug user fee program, however, is different because the
reauthorization for the fees is part of the substantive law and can be ac-
companied by substantive changes.137 The funding renewal bill is a “must
pass” bill that can become a vehicle for broader permanent changes.
131. Id. at 377.
132. See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution After Western
States, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 901, 912–13 & 933 (2003).
133. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999).
134. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
135. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).
136. See Whatley v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 814, 816 & 818 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(finding a rebuttable presumption that federal appropriations acts do not amend sub-
stantive law unless Congress clearly indicates the change is permanent).
137. See supra Part V.A.2 (describing some of the substantive changes of the 1997
renewal).
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4. The Impact of a Five-Year Timeframe
The renewal period for user fees tends to put the agency on a five-
year timeframe for trying to anticipate the emerging issues, and the politi-
cal landscape. The issues can be affected by sudden developments, as il-
lustrated by the safety risk for Vioxx while it was on the market, which
ultimately led Congress to expand the agency’s authority to identify and
address post-approval risks.138 While this strengthening of the agency’s
safety authority is a positive change, some may disagree with the need or
the scope of the changes. The important point is that the need to renew
user fees provides a platform for raising substantive changes, with a dead-
line for resolving any debate about the merit of the changes.
Those who work or teach in this field are aware of when a PDUFA
renewal is approaching. The drug law increasingly seems to have a tenta-
tive subject-to-change aspect. This undercuts the advantage of having a
“permanent” law where the prospect of change is not periodically on the
table. Making the user fee law permanent is one way to deal with the
drawbacks and linkage that are associated with a sunset provision.
5. Impact of Citizens United
The potential for politics to be a factor in the renewal legislation
may be enhanced by the Citizens United case.139 In this case, the Supreme
Court recognized corporations as persons with rights of free speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment and found limits on corporate spending
for endorsements or criticisms of political candidates to be unconstitu-
tional when independent of the official campaign.140 However, a require-
ment for disclosure of the corporate funding source would be
permissible.141 As a result, representatives and senators facing election
may consider the possibility that pharmaceutical companies may sponsor
advertisements in light of their votes on the user fee bill. Presidential can-
didates may also take into account the impact of drug company advertise-
ments when the election is close to a renewal period, as it will be in 2012.
Ending the sunset on user fees will reduce the potential for that height-
ened pressure.
B. Permanent User Fees and the Deficit
Making the user fees permanent would alleviate these problems, but
doing so could obscure Congress and the President’s responsibility in
138. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. R
139. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
140. Id. at 886.
141. Id.
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making the important decision of how to allocate government funds when
there is not enough to go around. The discussion below relates to the
status of a permanent program, the applicability of a general spending
freeze, the maintenance of enforcement resources, and the equity issue.
1. An “Uncontrollable” Cost?
Making the user fees permanent has a drawback because it can in-
troduce another “uncontrollable” budget cost at a time when the size of
the federal budget is emerging as an important public concern.142 The fed-
eral deficit keeps growing, and an intense debate has started on the need
for change.143 Indeed, the election of a Republican-controlled House led
to a near shutdown of the federal government over budget issues.144 How-
ever, whether cutbacks are needed is not the focus of this article. The
concern here is the appropriateness of insulating the drug user fee pro-
gram from reductions if a freeze or cuts in discretionary spending affect
comparable programs. The President’s Fiscal Commission supported a
freeze and cutbacks in areas of discretionary spending.145 And President
Obama supported a freeze on discretionary non-security programs in his
2011 State of the Union message;146 he had earlier ordered a freeze on
federal salaries, an approach that affects federal programs generally.147
Therefore, whether the drug user fee program will be considered discre-
tionary will have an important impact on the program’s ability to receive
funding, which makes important the criteria for determining what are dis-
cretionary programs as well as the basis for making reductions in such
discretionary programs.
2. Equity of Immunity from a Freeze
The major focus of the deficit and budget debate relates to major
spending programs, including entitlement programs, such as Medicare
and Social Security. The drug user fee program is not comparable to these
entitlement programs with respect to the scale of the funding involved
142. See supra note 114. R
143. See, e.g., FISCAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 25. R
144. See Carl Hulse, Last Minute Budget Deal Averts Government Shutdown, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, at A1.
145. See FISCAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 25, at 20–21 (Recommendation 1.1). R
146. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Proposing Bipartisan Effort to Win the Fu-
ture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1.
147. Peter Baker & Jackie Calmes, Obama Declares Two-Year Freeze on Federal
Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A1.
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and the expectations of recipients.148 Instead, the drug user fee program is
similar to regulatory programs that implement or enforce health and en-
vironmental standards. An important issue is whether the drug user fee
program should be insulated from reductions that may affect similar reg-
ulatory programs. For example, if the federal government were to require
an across the board spending freeze or funding cut for “discretionary fed-
eral programs,” would the drug user fee program be affected? Congress
has already considered cutbacks on funding for early childhood education
and public health, as well as food safety.149 If these programs are cut,
should spending on the drug user fee program continue and grow based
on a formula? These questions are so much a matter of judgment, and are
so significant and open to debate, that Congress needs to assume the re-
sponsibility for deciding on any special treatment for the drug user fee
program. Moreover, Congress should develop ways to assess the public
benefit generated from the different discretionary programs, and analyze
the achievements to be expected from the various programs through con-
tinued funding. A study on the public health benefit achieved by newly
approved drugs since user fees were adopted could help provide a bench-
mark and criteria in making these difficult assessments.150
148. The drug review program is authorized to have $392,783,000 in support from
user fees, with workload and inflation adjustments and additional funding of roughly
a similar amount from government appropriations. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h(b)(1)(A)–
(B), (b)(4)(B) & (c) (2006). Medicare spending in 2010 accounted for 12 percent of
the federal budget and is expected to increase from $519 billion in 2010 to $929 billion
in 2020. HENRY KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE SPENDING AND FI-
NANCING 1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-05.pdf.
Furthermore, the Social Security trust fund is projected to be exhausted by 2036. See
Bruce Bartlett, The Real Social Security and Medicare Problem (and a Doable Fix),
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/the-real-
social-security-and-medicare-problemand-a-doable-fix. One analysis projected that
the trust fund’s long-term deficit is 1.2 percent of the G.D.P., but the shortfall could
be addressed by increasing the tax rate to 16 percent, from 12.4 percent. Id.
149. See Carl Hulse, Republicans Propose More Cuts in Spending, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/us/politics/12spend.html (reporting
that House Republicans on the House Appropriations Committee are considering
cuts in discretionary spending, including food safety, college aid, early childhood edu-
cation, and national infrastructure). Cuts in food safety could affect foreign inspec-
tions. See FDA Would Reduce Foreign Food Inspections If Budget Cuts Pass, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, June 10, 2011 (reporting that the proposed $87 million cut in food-re-
lated programs could reduce inspections of Chinese food imports).
150. See supra Part III.D.
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3. FDA Enforcement Resources and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
Additional problems arise if a freeze applies to the resources availa-
ble to ensure enforcement of compliance with the drug laws, a problem
that could be compounded since the number of drugs approved would
continue to grow because of the support from user fees. With human na-
ture being what it is, the potential for compliance problems is likely to
occur at a similar rate.
The compliance issues can be particularly important with respect to
DTC television advertising, which manufacturers may run for newly ap-
proved drugs. The FDA has issued draft guidance on matters that need to
be considered in making adequate and non-misleading disclosures of risk
and benefit information in the DTC advertising.151 The guidance details
the range of factors that the agency considers in its review of the DTC
advertising.152 Without adequate support for the agency’s review, disclo-
sures about risk information in the advertisements may not be adequate.
Thus, a cut in enforcement support can be detrimental.153
4. Congress’s Role
Congress should be responsible for determining how to allocate
funds among worthy projects in a time when there may not be enough
funding to go around. This does not mean that the drug user fee program
should continue to have the five-year sunset that currently exists. The
drug user fee program should be “permanent” in the sense that it does
not have an automatic five-year time limit, but the law should make it
clear that Congress can reduce appropriations for the program as part of
an overall deficit allocation review and adjustment to deal with deficit
problems. Indeed, the program should be subject to any general cutbacks
or freezes that occur in discretionary programs unless Congress specifi-
cally exempts the drug user fee program. Congress needs to look at the
full range of federal programs and make determinations on how to “share
the pain.” Taking account of budget shortfalls is likely to be a painful and
onerous process and perhaps there will be some fiscal solution that makes
it unnecessary to deal with this difficult problem or perhaps there are
better solutions than those raised here. This discussion is an effort to
151. See F.D.A., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUS-
TRY: PRESENTING RISK INFORMATION IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND MEDICAL DE-
VICE PROMOTION (May 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM155480.pdf.
152. Id. at 6–18.
153. If government funding for compliance were to be reduced because of the defi-
cit, another option would be to have user fees support enforcement needs, but the
merit of that approach needs more evaluation.
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identify factors that affect a complex issue and the need for a benchmark
for assessing the fairness of the allocations among programs.
5. Shortfalls and Priorities
If government appropriations are reduced, the amount of user fees
would also need to be scaled back to avoid the capture problem. If the
funding and the fees are cut back, the agency is likely to fall behind on
meeting the performance goals for acting on drug approvals. If there is a
shortfall in funding, the agency should make the reviews based on the
priorities discussed previously in Part III. Additionally, an extended pe-
riod of delay may raise issues about lengthening the patent life of a drug,
an issue also raised previously, in Part III.C.
VI. CONCLUSION
Enacting drug legislation requires Congress to weave between the
desirable, the political, and the constitutionally permissible.154 The drug
user fee program makes it necessary at present to tackle that balance
every five years. The next renewal will be in fall 2012, before the presi-
dential election. The problems identified in this article that concern the
structure of the present program should be addressed.
User fees now provide more than half of the support for the
agency’s review of whether to approve a new drug as safe and effective.155
The fees are to support timely agency decisions, and the agency and in-
dustry negotiate on the timeliness goals for the reviews and the plans for
meeting those goals. Any further increases in the level of industry sup-
port can create a risk of capture and perception of undue influence by the
industry. The law should be changed to ensure that the level of the fees
cannot exceed the amount of funding provided through government
appropriations.
The drug user fee program also expires every five years unless re-
newed. The sunset and need for congressional action can set the stage for
legislative changes that might not have passed separately.156 The potential
for politics to be an important factor may be enhanced by the protections
afforded to corporations in the Citizens United decision. Ending the sun-
set on user fees will reduce the potential for that heightened pressure.
Making the drug user fee program permanent, though, has a drawback
154. Provisions enacted as part of user fee renewals set the stage for successful
challenges on commercial speech grounds, as discussed in supra Part V.A.2.
155. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 681–82. R
156. See supra Part V.A.2.
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since it can insulate the drug user fee program from the funding reduc-
tions that other programs may face. If the drug user fee program is made
permanent, Congress needs to retain its responsibility for determining the
need for reductions in order to deal with the federal deficit on an equita-
ble basis. To ensure this, the drug user fee program should be subject to
any general freeze in discretionary spending, unless Congress and the
President specifically exempt the program.
If the deficit necessitates reductions in the appropriations for the
drug user fee program, there may be a delay in reviewing applications for
approval of new drugs. That delay will make the criteria for determining
priority drugs even more important. The effect on the public’s health pro-
vides an appropriate benchmark for judging how much support is needed
for user fees in relationship to other funding needs.157 Congress needs to
retain its responsibility for deciding how to equitably share the pain of
budget shortfalls when the reductions impact important programs, includ-
ing the one for drug approvals.
157. See supra Part III.C.2.
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